critical theory and other political-theoretical alternatives at its horizons. All eight interviews traverse current events in politics and economics while maintaining a theoretical concern for larger questions of oppression, emancipation, recognition, culture, religion, ethics, and history.
-349 -Gabriel Rockhill and Summer Renault-Steele individualistic or subjective. It is the effort, on the part of social agents with unique but intertwined itineraries, to make sense of their setting by producing a working topology, viz., a projected cartography of a tremendously intricate situation. Every understanding of a conjuncture, it could be said, is a topological understanding insofar as it proposes-from within-a logic of place that seeks to orient us in the conjuncture by means of a navigational map that is neither purely objective nor absolutely subjective.
With this heuristic distinction in mind, we might say that Politics of Culture and the Spirit of Critique emerged, in part, out of a shared topological understanding of the current socio-political and cultural conjuncture, as well as out of a common set of concerns with how to develop transformative leverage within this unique force field. This conjuncture includes the rise to prominence of the practice and discourse of "globalization," i.e., the presumptuous and aggressive neoliberal funeral hymn for socialist alternatives. This incantatory death knell of historical options has seamlessly merged, in recent years, with the mumbo jumbo of the current political imaginary, in which the supposed opposition between democracy and terrorism thinly veils the pursuit of imperialist endeavors and the further evisceration of what is euphemistically called democracy. The repeated crises of neoliberalism have actually been largely recuperated by the ideological discourse of austerity and allowed for an even greater consolidation of class power. At the same time, the rise of what are called the new social movements, the emergence of new socialism in Latin America, and constant push-back on so many fronts-from imperialist resistance to cultural and ideological battles of various sorts-clearly reveal that not everyone is convinced that we are living at Fukuyama's end of history, in which liberal democracy and capitalism have paradoxically provided the utopian endgame of which Marx had only confusedly -350 -PhaenEx dreamt. In spite of what the corporate executors of the present might have us believe, it is clear that history is not at its end precisely because history is never destiny.
It is this shared topological understanding of our socio-political conjuncture, as well as a more specific concern with the status of cultural questions therein, that led us to the decision to organize a series of dialogues concerning the role of critical theory, broadly construed, in both thinking and intervening in our present situation. Indeed, one of the most general questions that animates this book is: What is the critical power of theoretical practices, and how can they gain transformative leverage on the current conjuncture? More specifically, in relationship to the critical theory tradition, this question can be formulated as follows: What is truly critical-in the double sense of the term-about critical theory? It is important to note, in this regard, that we are not wedded to a genealogical conception of critical theory, nor are we invested in defending the tradition of the Frankfurt School for its own sake. On the contrary, we seek to raise critical questions concerning, among other things, the retreat of radicalism in the work of many of the major representatives of this tradition. We also explicitly decided to engage with prominent contemporary intellectuals whose orientation is not directly aligned on the heritage of the Frankfurt School, including Judith Butler, Cornel West, and Immanuel Wallerstein. Finally, we thought that it was important to bring critical questions to bear on the liberal tradition by organizing dialogues with two prominent figures within this tradition, who have both sought to directly engage with the question of culture in the broad sense of the term: Michael Sandel and Will Kymlicka.
Regarding the immediate material nexus of the book, it is worth noting that these dialogues are in many ways borderline conversations situated on the horizons of different cultures, disciplines, and intellectual traditions. GR: Multiculturalism as a term and concept has a specific geographic genealogy that is partially distinct from that of the category of culture. The mechanisms of evaluation that we have at our disposal suggest that it rose to prominence during the last third of the twentieth century, beginning primarily but not exclusively in the Anglophone world. What this means, historically, is that it is bound up with a unique social, political, and economic conjuncture. In many ways, this conjuncture has been characterized by the spread of a post-revolutionary political imaginary that forecloses the possibility of a radical transformation of society. One of the sister concepts of multiculturalism, then, is the notion of globalization, which has a nearly identical history and is equally bound up with the spread of neoliberal capitalism in the era in which, according to Margret Thatcher, "There Is No Alternative." Given this specific history and geography of the notion of multiculturalism, one of the goals of this book was to critically reflect on the relationship between the cultural politics that came to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, on the one hand, and what is perceived as the retreat of revolutionary or transformative politics, on the other. In certain instances, it has surely been the case that the investment in cultural politics corresponds to a withdrawal from a transformative agenda. In this regard, we wanted to remove the ethical halo from mainstream multiculturalism and show the ways in which it has come to serve as a monopolistic and misleading oasis of "politics" that perfectly coalesces with the maintenance-if not the intensification-of the status quo under the neoliberal system of global capitalism. In fact, the -354 -PhaenEx differential logic of cultural recognition often seamlessly melds with the consumerist sacralization of difference in late capitalism. Naomi Klein has described this phenomenon in the following terms:
The need for greater diversity-the rallying cry of my university years-is now not only accepted by the culture industries, it is the mantra of global capital. And identity politics, as they were practiced in the nineties, weren't a threat, they were a gold mine. "This revolution," writes cultural critic Richard Goldstein in The Village Voice, "turned out to be the savior of late capitalism." (115) However, we also sought to avoid monolithic accounts of cultural politics that systematically lambasted them as pernicious forms of neoliberal ideology. After all, the denigration or sidelining of various cultural issues by those invested in transformative politics has often unnecessarily restricted the field of transformation and perpetuated status quo forms of oppression, as Angela Davis, Cornel West, and others have shown. One may think, for instance, of Friedrich Engels' rather derogatory statements on the feminist movement in Scandinavia, which he describes as "the more or less hysterical effusions of bourgeois and petty bourgeois women careerists" ("Letter to Paul Ernst, June 5, 1890").
2 It is a mistake, in my opinion, to establish monocausal forms of determinism between cultural politics and economic politics.
Indeed, there is much to be learned from what is generically called the cultural concern with the formation and oppression of various types of social and political identity. Overall, therefore, this book is motivated by the need for a critical reassessment of cultural politics that avoids the nontransformative tendencies of mainstream multiculturalism-as well as of its conservative counterpart, the "clash of civilizations" thesis-while also recognizing the need to entirely rethink the political modi operandi of the category of culture.
The modern concept of culture significantly predates the notion of multiculturalism, but it is equally a socio-historical formation specific to a unique conjuncture. In broad terms, it is a Gabriel Rockhill and Summer Renault-Steele European concept that came to function during the Enlightenment as an independent noun referring to a process of refinement or the result of such a process. It served in part, along with its sister concept of civilization, as a theoretical frame for understanding the relationship between different ethnic groups and regions of the world in terms of a historical narrative of development.
We might say, in very schematic terms, that the ontological difference of kind between "the savage" and the "the civilized" was replaced by a historical difference of degree according to which the former corresponded to the "primitive" stage of the latter. It is not difficult to see, then, how the culturally specific categories of culture and civilization played an important role in the historical accounts used to justify colonial expansion as well as cultural, political, and economic imperialism. If they were at an earlier stage of development, it was our duty, our mission civilizatrice, to bring them our culture and our economy. This being said, it is equally important to avoid simply identifying the category of culture as an ideological supplement to colonial capitalism. The notion of culture is also a powerful sense-making concept that helped foreground cultural variability and resituate European civilization in relation to the plurality of other socio-cultural formations. For instance, J. G. Herder used the category of culture at the end of the eighteenth century to at least partially attack the linear narrative of universal civilizational progress toward the telos of European Enlightenment in the name of recognizing the sheer multiplicity and diversity of cultural practices.
I agree with you, therefore, that the concern with cultural identities and numerous forms of cultural oppression predate the rise of multiculturalism properly speaking. Regarding the current relationship between cultural politics and distributive politics, I would say that it is not so much a question of dissolving the dichotomy as overcoming the widespread social theory of quasi-autonomous spheres. It is not at all the case that the realm of culture is clearly distinct from Rather than culture being understood as a set of aesthetic and intellectual developments … it is identified with collective forms of life-ranging from gender and sexual identities to membership in various ethnic, linguistic, and national groups-that play a central role in politics and morality … In spite of their important differences, these authors have distanced themselves from critical reflection on aesthetics (15).
You stipulate that despite this general shift in the meaning of culture, some of the authors in this collection (presumably West) still touch on aesthetic concerns. Nevertheless, this general turn away from aesthetics signifies that the relationship between the politics of culture and the spirit of critique has significantly altered in this most recent generation of critical theory (see 15).

What do you make of this turn away from aesthetic analysis? Is something lost in omitting the aesthetic as a site for the critical investigation of cultural politics? And, how do you -357 -Gabriel Rockhill and Summer Renault-Steele see this turn in relationship to the relatively recent blossoming of disciplines such as cultural studies, communication studies, or cinema and media studies, where the political analysis of culture regularly entails a serious exploration of aesthetic phenomena? The spirit of my question is not to assert some kind of fidelity to a "tradition" of aesthetic criticism in the Frankfurt
School, nor is it to protest about what counts as critical theory. Rather, I am hoping to hear your thoughts about this turn away from aesthetics, how you see critical theory's lineage next to the emergence of disciplines like cultural studies, and, if you think this means anything for philosophy?
GR: The work of some of the major living representatives of Frankfurt School critical theory clearly attests to an abandonment of aesthetics. Authors like Seyla Benhabib, Rainer Forst, Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth, and Thomas McCarthy are decidedly more interested in moral and political questions than in the social role of the arts. This is one of the reasons that we pointed to an overall shift in the role of the category of culture for a significant portion of third generation critical theory, as you mentioned in your question. Peter Uwe Hohendahl has also recently emphasized this fact: "In the official transition from Habermas to Axel Honneth, who was recently appointed Habermas's successor at the University of Frankfurt, the aesthetic question, which was so prominent in the work of Adorno and Benjamin, has been moved to the background" (19). However, before exploring the reasons for such a shift, it is important to highlight the numerous exceptions to this general rule, which primarily applies to the neo-or With these important qualifications in mind, it seems to me that the abandonment of aesthetics by a certain tradition of critical theory is due in part to at least two factors, which also plague the work of some of the authors just referenced. To begin with, contemporary critical theory has become a specialized academic discourse. In the process, the interdisciplinary orientation of the first generation of the Frankfurt School has largely given way to scholarly expertise, particularly in the fields of moral, social, and political philosophy. This increasing specialization has come at a very high methodological price. In addition to the abandonment of aesthetics, the severing of psychoanalysis from the project of critical theory further contrasts the work of many of the neo-or post-Habermasians with the research agendas of figures like Benjamin and Marcuse. Instead of nostalgically bewailing the demise of the broad intellectual engagements of the early Frankfurt School, I think that it is of the utmost importance to develop new methods and to hone old tools for a critical theory of contemporary society in all of its diverse aspects, which draws on numerous traditions rather than obsessively defending a particular genealogy, lineage, or pedigree.
The other factor that has contributed to the abandonment of aesthetics has been the unraveling of the various historical accounts linking aesthetics to politics. I have in mind, more specifically, the overwhelming prominence of the "end of illusions" thesis, which consists in affirming that the avant-garde dreams of an art capable of transforming society revealed themselves to be just as illusory as those of the utopians who thought they could usher in a classless society. This thesis, which presents our era as the enlightened age of the end of aesthetic and political illusions, knows many versions, and it can be celebrated or bemoaned Gabriel Rockhill and Summer Renault-Steele without changing its fundamental structure. Peter Bürger's Theory of the Avant-Garde is worth citing in this regard because it perfectly manifests what has become the standard historical thesis, which recognizes as a fait accompli the failure of the historical avant-garde due to its recuperation by the institution of art against which it had revolted. Following upon the supposed disappointment of the neo-avant-garde, Bürger arrives at what appears to many as the only logical conclusion: the project of an avant-garde coalescence of art and politics is the illusion of a bygone era. Whereas Bürger decided to write a requiem for this avant-garde dream, many theorists simply turned their back on aesthetics.
The disenchantment with the avant-garde-broadly construed-accompanies, in many ways, a parallel disillusionment with revolutionary politics. It is extremely revealing, in this regard, that Bürger explicitly presents his theoretical intervention, which is obviously rooted in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, in terms of a post-1968 melancholy and the sobering realization that "all revolutions have failed": "When I conceived of Theory of the Avant-Garde ... the impulses that the May events had awakened had already been arrested" (700, 698). 4 This retreat from political radicalism, as I briefly mentioned above, is another key feature of contemporary critical theory. It is true of course, that the first generation of the Frankfurt School had a complicated relationship to revolutionary politics, and it is arguable that its major representatives were by no means as radical as it is sometimes suggested, particularly during the postwar era. However, when you compare the work of many of the authors mentioned above to the writings of Marcuse in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for instance, it is readily apparent that the reformist project of improving the systems of democratic representation in place has largely overtaken the radical critique of the status quo in the name of a revolutionary transformation of GR: The organization of the book is, indeed, thematic and episodic rather than linear and progressive. In addition to dialogues with contemporary critical theorists, we decided to include discussions with figures at the boundaries of the critical theory tradition as well as with major representatives of contemporary liberalism in order to present at least three overlapping constellations of theoretical practices and inquire into the status of critical theory in the current conjuncture. It is true, of course, that post-Habermasian critical theory has largely become one of -362 -PhaenEx the specialized interlocutors in the debates on political liberalism, and this was certainly one of our major concerns in the book. On the one hand, we sought to reactivate the revolutionary spirit of the more radical political orientation of some of the early critical theorists. This is true not only in our conversations with the representatives of the liberal tradition. It is also the case for our dialogues with those who identify with the critical theory tradition. On the other hand, and in spite of our willingness to directly engage with political liberalism, we evince throughout the book our concern for a truly critical theory that is not simply beholden to the liberal heritage. If there is a future for critical theory, it surely lies in this direction.
In the current political and social conjuncture, the incessant convulsive seizures of neoliberal capitalism suggest that the "liberal" centre-in both the political and the economic sense of the term-cannot hold in its current state. The massive social uprisings from Latin America to the entire Mediterranean region, including the Occupy movement in the United States and elsewhere, indicate that history-as I mentioned above-has by no means come to an end in the sense that the neoliberal apologists for pseudo-democracy would like to have us believe. If we add to this the fact that contemporary critical theory has at least partially become a specialized and more centrist discourse in moral, social, and political philosophy, then it becomes clear the extent to which it needs to reinvent itself in order to have any critical bearing on the current situation. This not only means rethinking the potential for revolutionary transformation of the current social, political, and economic order. It also means extending the purview of analysis beyond the confines of politics and morality in order to engage more directly with the fields of economics, aesthetics, history, psychoanalysis, etc.
Such an orientation, as I have noted, by no means presupposes remaining faithful to the first generation of the Frankfurt School or, for that matter, the Marxist tradition. Indeed, one of -363 -Gabriel Rockhill and Summer Renault-Steele the gestures necessary to revitalize the critical spirit found in some of the early Frankfurt School and many of its allies is precisely a critique of critical theory. To this end, an anti-sectarian engagement with other traditions and orientations is absolutely necessary. Hence our decision to include discussions with radical thinkers like Butler, West, and Wallerstein, as well as our references to the importance of Sartrean situationalism, pragmatism, liberation theology, the work of Gramsci, and so on. For critical theory to reinvent itself in the current conjuncture, it need not be concerned with intellectual pedigree, genealogical fidelity, or professional expertise in the restricted, academic sense of the term. Indeed, critical theory loses its critical edge as soon as it shirks self-criticism in the name of defending a particular history, a pantheon of ordained thinkers, or a set of enshrined commitments. In short, critical theory, in order to have a future worthy of its name, must be nothing if not critical. 
